



Historical Pathways to Sovereignty Fakh al-Dīn II and the Arab Revolt in Policy Perspective

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Abstract: This study examines two key moments in Arab history—Emir Fakh al-Dīn II's 17th-century experiment in pluralist governance and the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918—as lenses to understand the ongoing struggle for sovereignty in the Middle East. Fakh al-Dīn's alliance with Renaissance Tuscany and his inclusive administration in Mount Lebanon demonstrate a practical model of statecraft based on commerce, tolerance, and institutional innovation. In contrast, the Arab Revolt, sparked by Sharif Husayn's call for independence and driven by British promises, shows the danger of mobilising without solid guarantees. Both episodes, separated by centuries, focus on a common theme: the tension between local aspirations and imperial manipulation. Building on these histories, the paper outlines a seven-point policy framework for the Global South—highlighting pluralist governance, conditional foreign partnerships, formalised mediation, local capacity development, inclusive jurisprudence, evidence collection, and civic education. These lessons are not just ideals, but practical strategies to turn sovereignty from a symbolic goal into a lasting reality. The paper contends, by combining historical lessons with modern policy planning, that the path to legitimate governance is not through heroic moments or external pledges, but through the daily labour of creating inclusive institutions. This is more than just a historical reflection; it is a call to urgent statecraft for states facing geopolitical storms and the continuous struggle for dignity.

Kata kunci: pluralist governance, imperial intervention, foreign patronage, local governance, state-building

Introduction

History is more than a distant echo in the modern Middle East; it is a real, breathing force that influences destiny. The region's chaotic present, marked by sectarian violence, geopolitical betrayal, and the excruciating battle for self-determination, cannot be understood without confronting its founding hopes and tragedies. This study explores two important moments: the bold reign of Emir Fakh al-Dīn II, the 'Renaissance Prince' of 17th-century Lebanon, and the seismic 1916-1918 Arab Revolt, the magnificent but betrayed revolt for freedom from Ottoman domination.

These narratives, separated by three centuries, are inextricably linked by a common, haunting theme: the relentless pursuit of sovereignty in the face of overwhelming imperial power, and the tragic chasm between visionary ambition and harsh political reality. Understanding this dialectic is not an academic exercise; it is essential to diagnosing the chronic ailments of a region still grappling with the ghosts of

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empires and the promises of freedom that were never fully kept.

The story of Fakhr al-Dīn Ma'n is a testament to a fleeting, yet revolutionary, possibility. In an era defined by Ottoman dominance, Fakhr al-Dīn (1572-1635) forged a quasi-independent state in Mount Lebanon that became a beacon of multicultural coexistence and economic innovation. His legendary treaty with the Medici of Tuscany in 1608 was not merely a trade agreement; it was a bold act of geopolitical defiance, an attempt to weave Lebanon into the fabric of Renaissance Europe (Gorton, 2014). His legacy—importing Tuscan artisans to build khans and roads, patronising religious tolerance, and creating an administration that included Druze, Christians, and Muslims—proves that the model of a cohesive, multi-confessional Levantine state is not a modern fantasy but a historical precedent (Olsaretti, 2008).

Yet, his brutal execution in Constantinople in 1635 serves as a grim reminder of the ultimate price of autonomy in the shadow of empire. His statue in Deir al-Qamar, dynamited during the Lebanese Civil War, symbolises how his legacy remains a contested football in the nation's fractured memory—a symbol of unity for some, a threat to sectarian narratives for others (Gorton, 2014). In a contemporary Lebanon teetering on the brink of collapse—with a GDP plummeting by over 58% between 2019 and 2024, and state institutions failing (World Bank, 2024)—Fakhr al-Dīn's vision of a prosperous, tolerant, and sovereign entity offers a poignant and painful contrast to today's realities.

If Fakhr al-Dīn's story is one of a local dream crushed by imperial force, the Arab Revolt is the epic tale of a pan-Arab dream betrayed by imperial duplicity. Launched in June 1916 by Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, the Revolt was fueled by the British promise of an independent Arab kingdom stretching 'from the Euphrates to the Nile', as detailed in the contentious Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (Antonius, 1938). It was a moment of unparalleled hope, brilliantly captured in the mythologised exploits of T.E. Lawrence and the sacrificial heroism of Arab tribesmen who severed the Hejaz Railway and captured Aqaba. This struggle, which cost an estimated 10,000 Arab lives, was meant to birth a new Arab world free from centuries of Ottoman subjugation (Rogan, 2015).

Yet, this hope was systematically dismantled by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which carved the region into British and French mandates and pledged a national home for Jews in Palestine (Fromkin, 1989). The consequence was not just a broken promise but a profound trauma that seeded a century of anti-Western resentment and political instability. The revolt's ultimate failure, historian Eugene Rogan argues, "bequeathed to the independent Arab states a legacy of suspicion and resentment of the West that would shape Arab-Western relations for the rest of the twentieth century and beyond" (Rogan, 2015).

This study matters profoundly because it argues that the unresolved tensions from these two historical junctures—Fakhr al-Dīn's challenge to Ottoman hegemony and the Arab Revolt's betrayal by European powers—are not relics. They are the very foundations upon which the modern Middle East's crises are built. The region's ongoing struggles with sectarian identity, weak state institutions, and external intervention can be traced directly to this history of suppressed local agency and imperial manipulation. By placing the narratives of Fakhr al-Dīn and the Arab Revolt in dialogue, this analysis moves beyond simplistic timelines to explore the enduring conflict between indigenous aspirations for

self-rule and the destructive power of external domination.

It is a crucial exploration for anyone seeking to understand why, despite immense human and natural capital, the Arab world continues to be plagued by what the UN describes as a 'deficit of dignity' and a crisis of legitimate governance (UNDP, 2022). In the end, to study Fakhr al-Dīn and the Arab Revolt is to engage in an act of historical urgency—to comprehend the roots of contemporary anguish and to recognise that the quest for a just and sovereign order in the Middle East remains the region's most pressing, and unfinished, revolution.

Method

This study employs a qualitative, multiple-evidence case-study approach—systematic document observation of archival materials, contemporary dispatches, published memoirs, and secondary scholarship—complemented by purposive semi-structured discussions with historians, regional specialists, and policy practitioners to triangulate interpretations; the two cases (Fakhr al-Dīn II and the Arab Revolt) were selected purposively for their analytical leverage on state-building dynamics, and documents were analyzed following a structured protocol (close reading, extraction of timelines, actor mapping, and institutional tracing) while credibility was strengthened through source triangulation and member-checking of interpretive summaries with select discussants; this multiple-evidence design enhances construct validity and reliability in line with established case-study methods (Yin, 2018), though limitations such as archival gaps, language constraints, and retrospective bias are acknowledged and discussed.

Result and Discussion

Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II stands as one of Lebanon's most romanticised leaders – a 'colourful and controversial' prince hailed by later generations as *al-um` al-'asr* (father of the nation), even a 'founder of the modern Lebanese state' to some. Yet historians note that earlier scholarship often overstates his role. Fakhr al-Dīn inherited leadership of the Druze Ma'n dynasty at age 13 after his father's death in an Ottoman punitive campaign. He painstakingly rebuilt his power, forging alliances through commerce, marriage and tribute (Bakhit, 1972; Shafir, 2016).

By the early 1600s, he had reasserted control over Mount Lebanon and beyond: his domains stretched from Sidon-Beirut in the west all the way inland to Palmyra and south as far as Galilee. This control of key Levantine ports (Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, Acre) gave Fakhr al-Dīn access to nearly all overland and coastal trade in the region. In 1608 he signed a landmark treaty with Tuscany: for Ferdinando I de' Medici, it opened Levantine markets, and for Fakhr al-Dīn it provided a powerful patron and even safe haven if the Ottomans turned on him (The Medici granted him asylum in Livorno should Sultan Murād IV object too strongly) (Saudi Aramco World, 2014; Olsaretti, 2008).



Fakhr al-Dīn's palace at Deir al-Qamar – now the Marie Baz Wax Museum – retains its Ottoman-era stone facade. Through European alliances, Fakhr al-Dīn transformed Lebanon's architecture and economy: he imported Tuscan artisans to build roads, khans, and public works (e.g., Beirut's Khan al-Franj), introducing Italianate Renaissance styles into Beirut and elsewhere (Wikipedia, n.d.).

After the Tuscan accord, however, Fakhr al-Dīn's rise alarmed Istanbul. Facing a massive Ottoman army in 1613, he fled by ship to Tuscany with a motley entourage of Druze, Maronites, Sunni Muslims and even two Jewish counsellors – together with his wife and infant daughter. He spent five transformative years in Italy under Grand Duke Cosimo II's care, attending Florentine opera and learning the latest European science and military ideas. Yet Europe's fascination with its 'Turkish emir' was tinged with tension: Fakhr al-Dīn's own chronicle notes how Europeans freely spent their vast revenues (talking of tens of thousands of florins in income) while he observed their social customs (Daher, 2010; Salibi, 1988).

When he returned in 1618, the balance of power had shifted: old rivals had been ousted in Damascus, and Fakhr al-Dīn swiftly recaptured lost territories and forts. He attacked the Sayfā family in Tripoli (killing their palaces in 1619) and took Sidon, Tripoli and the Bekaa back under his rule. Under him, Lebanon enjoyed a rare period of unity (Saudi Aramco World, 2014; Salibi, 1988).

Notably, Fakhr al-Dīn used his Western experience to modernise his emirate. He introduced new economic and cultural institutions based on Tuscan models. Key reforms and projects included: [1] Italianate infrastructure and trade promotion: He commissioned caravanserais (e.g. Sidon's *Khan al-Franj*), roads and ports to boost commerce, often with Italian artisans. [2] European-inspired public works: He hired Florentine experts in construction, irrigation, medicine and agriculture to improve urban planning and farming. [3] Education and printing: He patronised Jesuit and Maronite schools and imported the first Arabic printing presses to Beirut (Harris, 2012; Makdisi, 2000).

These efforts made Mount Lebanon economically vibrant and culturally cosmopolitan. Fakhr al-Dīn's rule was famously tolerant: contemporaries note he persecuted no one for creed or origin, and he even included Christians and Druze alike in his administration. European chroniclers praised his generosity and prowess – one 1610 English visitor, George Sandys, remarked he was 'small of stature, but great in courage and achievements' (Saudi Aramco World, 2014; Makdisi, 2000).

Yet by 1633, Murād IV could no longer countenance Fakhr al-Dīn's power. An Ottoman force of some 20,000 overwhelmed Fakhr al-Dīn's 8,000, killing his eldest son 'Alī as he tried to block enemy advances. The Emir fled into the hills, but was betrayed, captured and brought to Constantinople. On April 13, 1635, Fakhr al-Dīn II was executed (strangled and beheaded), along with his eldest surviving son. His legacy, however, lived on. In architecture, Beirut's ruined 17th-century palace (later described in 1700s travelogues as having "courts...worth the quality of a prince in Christendom") stood as a testament to its era. Politically, historians note that Fakhr al-Dīn's example showed Lebanon's religious communities could cooperate for common rule (Salibi, 1998).

Indeed, even today, he is remembered as Lebanon's 'renaissance emir', though his image is debated: a 1970s statue calling him '*Father of the Nation*' was dynamited during Lebanon's civil war as political factions reinterpreted his significance. Even among Arab nationalists versus particularists, Fakhr al-Dīn became a 'football' of identity. What endures uncontroversially is his vision of a modern, tolerant state – the Turkish "Great Duke" of Europe, as a Lebanese wax museum puts it (Cleveland & Bunton, 2024; Saudi Aramco World, 2014).

The Great Arab Revolt (1916–1918): Aspirations for Arab Independence



Sharīf Husayn ibn 'Alī of Mecca (centre) in 1920, flanked by Ottoman-era guards. Husayn's 1916-

18 uprising against the Ottomans (with British backing) became the founding myth of modern Arab nationalism (NamuWiki, 2025).

By 1916, the Ottoman Empire was reeling in World War I. In the Hejaz, Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Alī (the Hashemite Emir of Mecca) saw an opportunity: he envisioned an independent Arab kingdom, stretching 'from the Euphrates to the Nile', free of Ottoman rule. For decades, he had resented Ottoman centralisation, and he secretly engaged Arab nationalists (al-Faṭḥ or al-Ḥaṭf). In 1915–16, Husayn gained the ear of Britain’s High Commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon, exchanging letters pledging Arab support for the Allied cause in return for British recognition of Arab independence after the war. Unknown to Husayn, Britain had simultaneously made conflicting deals – the 1916 Sykes–Picot agreement with France and the 1917 Balfour Declaration promising a Jewish homeland – that would later betray Arab hopes (Antonius, 1938).

In early June 1916, at a camp in Medina, Husayn’s sons ‘Alī and Faysal declared an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. On 10 June 1916, Husayn himself fired the ceremonial rifle shot in Mecca that formally ignited the uprising. That act – cloaked in the religious prestige of the Hashemite sharif — announced 'Independence to the Arab nation' and rallied Bedouin and townsfolk alike to the cause.

From the outset, the Arab forces proved resourceful guerrillas. They sabotaged the Hejaz Railway, cutting Ottoman supply lines. In July 1916, Arab fighters (with British guns) took Medina’s waterworks, and by September, they captured Taif. With British naval gunfire support, they then seized the Red Sea port of Jiddah, opening a lifeline for supplies. In 1917, the revolt reached its greatest triumph: T. E. Lawrence and Faysal led 700 Bedouins on a daring march across the desert to capture the port of ‘Aqaba (August 1917) (Lawrence, 1935).

Meanwhile, Sherifian troops joined General Allenby’s campaigns in Palestine, participating indirectly in the British victories at Gaza and Jerusalem (December 1917). By mid-1918, the Arab northern army – largely composed of tribal cavalry and Ottoman Arab POWs – cut into Ottoman Syria. In October 1918, both Allied cavalry and Arab forces converged on Damascus virtually simultaneously. The Ottomans there soon surrendered, and on 30 October 1918, the Armistice of Mudros officially ended Ottoman war-making. The Syrian National Congress hastily proclaimed Faysal king of Syria in March 1920, relying on the Revolt’s legacy as legitimation (Fromkin, 1989).

Yet the rewards were far fewer than Arab leaders had hoped. British and French diplomats carved up the Levant into mandate territories. Greater Syria (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine) went to France, Iraq and Transjordan to Britain, and only the Hijaz became a Hashemite kingdom – albeit under British influence. The hushed dissidence over Sykes–Picot and Balfour turned into open bitterness, fueling revolts (e.g. Iraq 1920) and Arab

nationalist movements. In this light, Husayn's revolt was driven more by Hashemite dynastic ambitions aligning with British strategy than by a cohesive popular nationalism (Gelvin, 2018).

Still, *public memory* of the Arab Revolt became profoundly emotional. Later Arab thinkers like George Antonius (in *The Arab Awakening*) and poets like Fu'ād al-Khāṭīb lionised the Revolt's ideals of heroism, sacrifice and Arab unity. As historian Peter Wien (2017) puts it, the Arab Revolt "remained... the founding myth of Arab nationalism," a tale of awakening from Ottoman slumber. Even today, millions across the Arab world learn of Husayn's rifle shot and Lawrence's exploits as foundational history. The modern flags of Jordan, Palestine and Syria still echo the revolt's tricolour, and schools glorify the Sharif's brief dream of unity.

In sum, both Fakhr al-Dīn II's reign and the 1916–1918 Arab Revolt have been narrated with great passion in Arab memory. Fakhr al-Dīn's legacy is one of local pride and tolerance: he remains a symbol of Lebanon's 'golden age' of Ottoman rule, an example of multi-confessional governance. The Arab Revolt's legacy is broader: its sacrifice and betrayal sensitised Arabs to Western duplicity, and its dreams seeded the modern idea of Arab nationhood. Both episodes generated voluminous scholarship and continue to inspire poetry, literature and national narratives – a testament to how much 'heroes and myths' shape the Middle East's history as much as dry diplomacy.

From Revolt to Resilience: Institutional Foundations of Durable Sovereignty in the Global South

When history speaks, it often does so in two voices: one that tells of bold leaders and dramatic uprisings, and another that whispers the slow, structural truths those events expose. Fakhr al-Dīn II's short, dazzling experiment in seventeenth-century Lebanon and the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918 are separated by centuries and method, but read together they offer an indispensable lesson for the Global South: durable sovereignty is built in the daily architecture of institutions, not in single acts of heroism or abandoned wartime promises.

Fakhr al-Dīn showed how a local polity could convert commerce, pluralism and pragmatic diplomacy into resilient authority. He stitched together mountain communities, coastal ports and mercantile networks; he courted Tuscan patrons and imported artisans and ideas; he built roads and khans that made rule legible and livelihoods more secure. His polity lasted while it functioned as a multi-communal bargain. The Arab Revolt, by contrast, revealed the opposite danger. Sharīf Husayn's rifle shot in Mecca in 1916 catalysed a mobilising narrative of Arab independence — a narrative that the British and French could promise and then quietly undercut at Sykes-Picot, leaving a generation with memories of sacrifice and the bitter taste of betrayal.

Both episodes show that legitimacy without enforceable instruments — and mobilisation without institutional anchors — leaves societies vulnerable to rupture.

From those twin histories, we draw seven pragmatic lessons — a policy playbook — for leaders across the Global South who seek to convert statehood into justice, and promise into protection.

First, build practical pluralism into governance. Fakhr al-Dīn's emirate survived because plural communities shared administration and benefit; exclusion breeds insurgency. Governments should legislate mixed local councils in contested regions that combine elected members, traditional leaders and civil-society representatives to vet major projects, allocate revenues and adjudicate local disputes. Transparency of those decisions is the critical trust dividend.

Second, attach enforceable 'compact clauses' to external deals. The Arab Revolt demonstrates the perils of promises unbacked by mechanisms. Every major foreign agreement — loans, military assistance, infrastructure deals — must contain phased disbursement tied to measurable governance benchmarks: procurement transparency, local employment rates and land-rights protections. Such clauses shift patronage from rhetorical patronage to verifiable partnership.

Third, protect mediation sanctuaries and back-channels as public goods. Doha's recent difficulties show how quickly neutral space can vanish from the diplomatic inventory. Regional funds should underwrite the logistics and legal safety of mediators, while neighbouring states agree to rapid demarches and political costs when sanctuaries are attacked. Diplomacy needs safe rooms as surely as commerce needs ports.

Fourth, pair big projects with local capacity building — the “factory-school” model. Fakhr al-Dīn's artisans brought skills that anchored his political project. Today's infrastructure and defence buys must fund technical institutes, apprenticeships and co-production commitments. Set concrete targets — for instance, 30–40% local hire and certified technician quotas for major projects — and use blended finance (MDB lines plus donor grants) to smooth initial costs. The dividend is social licence and a domestic maintenance base that reduces long-term dependency.

Fifth, institutionalise pluralist jurisprudence. Where religious or customary authority matters, governments should sponsor inclusive councils — plural, transparent bodies that deliberate public ethics and provide non-binding guidance on disputes such as land claims, minority rights and wartime conduct. Public, multilingual deliberations inoculate societies against absolutist voices that exploit ambiguity and grievance.

Sixth, invest in evidence preservation and proxy justice. The Arab Revolt's unresolved legacies underline the importance of preserving testimony and forensic evidence. Regional forensic archives, legally admissible and internationally supervised,

protect the truth for future judicial or restorative processes. Paired with witness protection and legal clinics, these hubs make accountability actionable rather than aspirational.

Seventh, teach plural memory and civic skills in schools. Durable sovereignty is cultural long before it is technical. Curricula should embed local histories, media literacy and dispute-resolution skills; mother-tongue early literacy programmes and inter-regional student exchanges build empathetic bonds. UNESCO and UNDP frameworks offer tested templates for such curriculum reform — but the commitment must be domestic and financed.

These lessons are not abstract. They map onto measurable reforms: the share of local content in infrastructure procurement, the number of mixed-governance councils operational in fragile provinces, the yearly volume of disbursements conditioned on Compact Clause benchmarks, or the number of technicians certified per US\$100m of defence and infrastructure spending. Multilateral development banks, UNESCO, UNDP and regional partners can underwrite pilots; civil society can co-design accountability metrics; parliaments can legislate the transparency mechanisms that make trust sticky.

If the Global South wants sovereignty that lasts, it must learn to be methodical and modest about power. Heroic moments — Fakhr al-Dīn's diplomatic audacity; the Arab Revolt's stirring rifle shot — inspire. But inspiration without structure is a provocation; structure without legitimacy is a brittle shell. The third path is practice: build institutions that make pluralism habitual, convert external patronage into conditional partnership, and invest in the social and technical capabilities that let people maintain the projects that claim to serve them. History's cruel lesson is that broken promises and excluded communities beget cycles of violence that stain generations. The practical hope is that nations can act differently: by embedding protection into contracts, inclusion into constitutions, and mutual respect into schools. That is not romantic. It is urgent statecraft. If the Global South follows this playbook, it will not only survive the storms of geopolitics — it will turn the storms into the very force that deepens democracy and secures dignity for all.

Conclusion

Fakhr al-Dīn II and the Arab Revolt together underscore that durable sovereignty is produced less by singular feats than by the quotidian institutions that follow them; translating heroic narratives into resilient polities therefore requires a deliberate shift from spectacle to structure — enforceable compacts, pluralist legal arrangements, transparent fiscal and memory institutions, and sustained capacity investments that align elite incentives with citizen expectations. Policymakers and international partners who seek stable, sovereign states would do well to prioritise measurable institutional reforms (benchmarked audits, legally guaranteed consultative processes, transparent financial vehicles, and locally led capacity building) over one-off prestige projects, and to bind

external assistance to verifiable conditions so that support strengthens rather than substitutes domestic agency. Success should be judged by ordinary citizens' experience of predictable administration, access to dispute-resolution, and the consistent enforcement of public commitments.

Future study should deepen and test the playbook's empirical foundations through coordinated archival work across Ottoman, British, French and regional repositories; broader comparative studies in diverse world regions; development of quantitative indicators for playbook elements; and grounded ethnographic and subnational research to surface implementation realities. Complementary policy-pilot evaluations and digital-humanities initiatives (forensic archives and open repositories) would both improve accountability and inform scalable reforms. Methodologically, such work will benefit from mixed-methods designs, multilingual archival teams, and collaborative partnerships with scholars and practitioners from the regions studied to ensure rigorous evidence, local ownership, and constructive policy relevance.

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