



Provision of Labor Resources for the Construction of Irrigation and Reclamation Facilities in the Bukhara Region in the 1950s–1960s: Patterns and Impacts of Agricultural Migration

Mirzoev Sharifjon Mirshakarovich*

Bukhara State Pedagogical Institute; sharifjonmirzoyev1998@gmail.com

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*Correspondence: Mirzoev Sharifjon Mirshakarovich

Email:

sharifjonmirzoyev1998@gmail.com

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Abstract: This study investigates the provision of labor resources for the construction of irrigation and reclamation facilities in the Bukhara region during the 1950s and 1960s, focusing on internal agricultural migration influenced by Soviet state policies. The research aims to examine the mechanisms, socio-economic consequences, and challenges of resettlement processes, as well as their broader impact on regional development in Soviet Uzbekistan. Using the historical-genetic method, archival documents, official Soviet-era decrees, and contemporary media sources were analyzed. The findings reveal significant discrepancies between resettlement and placement plans, which resulted in failures to retain migrant populations in new territories. The disorganization in household selection, implementation gaps, and delays in distributing promised benefits such as housing, loans, and tax exemptions led to mass returns of migrants. The study concludes that centrally planned resettlement policies, without adequate logistical and social preparedness, caused long-term setbacks in rural development and social integration.

Keywords: Resettlement, Plan, New Land, Households, Decision, Privilege, Propaganda, Housing, Social Facilities.

Introduction

During the Soviet government's resettlement policy, it faced financial, logistical, housing, social facilities, and a number of other problems. The central government has developed a number of measures aimed at solving these problems and put them into practice. However, it took a long time for a mechanism to fully address the problems of resettlement policy to be formed. The plans designed to solve the problems did not take into account the stereotypes and mental characteristics of the republics of the union and the peoples living in them. Republican governments would often have to deal independently with problems that arose during the resettlement policy process. However, the normative and legal documents set by the center limited the independence of the allied republics. In this case, it is possible to witness that the process of timely and positive solution of problems has become incredibly protracted. During the resettlement policy implemented in Uzbekistan in 1950-1980, there were unspeakable problems. In particular, the planning of

resettlement activities, the involvement of migrants in the resettlement process, registration of their documents, transfer from one place to another, relocation of households, freedom and privileges for migrants (providing them with loans, livestock, land for private farming, tax exemptions, housing, etc.) the organization of economic life for new settlers and the mass return of migrants are include such as issues.

Research Methodology

After the war, the process of providing the necessary labor force for the construction of irrigation and reclamation facilities built in the Bukhara region through the efforts of the Soviet government was analyzed using the historical-genetic method. In particular, archival sources were studied, the need for water infrastructure development was identified, and based on decisions adopted during the Soviet era, an assessment was made of the mechanism for attracting labor resources to construction sites and its effectiveness. The attitude toward the policy of migrant resettlement was also thoroughly covered based on periodical press materials and available publications.

Result and Discussion

In 1950, a plan to relocate 1,100 households in Bukhara region was approved from above and submitted to the regional administration for implementation. Under the pressure of the center, the plan approved by the Government of the Republic did not take into account the internal potential of the region. By August 1950, the republican administration realized that it had made a mistake in developing a plan to relocate the households. On August 28, 1950, by the decision of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan No. 1539, the resettlement plan of the region was reduced to 500 households [3.P.278]. Despite the reduction of the resettlement plan for the province, it was intended to maintain the overall volume set by the center. That is, the relocation of 16,000 households indicated by the Center for 1950 [5.P.33] while maintaining the plan, a total of 1,100 households in the country were reduced, while 1,100 households were added to Tashkent region [3.P.278]. It is necessary to emphasize that in the years when Stalin ruled the state, the decisions taken in the center would reach regional executive power in a week or two. Although resettlement measures in the Central Asian republics were much slower than in the central regions of the USSR, very deliberately short deadlines were set for the implementation of the decisions. When a comparative analysis of the resettlement plan and the housing plan for mobile farms is made, the discrepancy in this regard becomes apparent. For example, the relocation plan was adopted on January 28, 1950, while the housing plan was adopted on August 28, 1950 [3.P.299]. As a result of the irrationality, the displaced population was accommodated in temporary and abandoned buildings. This led to a mass return of migrants. For example, in Bukhara region this year, 21 of the farms relocated due to housing problems decided to return to their former places of residence [3.P.299]. In this case, of course, the regional administration has made a —worthy contribution‖ to making the resettlement policy more complex. In other words, the propaganda aimed at attracting migrants from the areas where the resettlement is planned, the explanatory work on the benefits for farms, was completed in a timely manner in the Kazakhs. Main part The issue of selection of relocated households

was even more tragic, as the issue was resolved in the cabinet by mutual agreement of the inspector of the regional relocation department, the district party committee and the representatives of the agriculture department. The importance of explanatory and propaganda activities was highly valued by Soviet government officials. For this reason, clear mechanisms have been developed to carry out explanatory work in the areas where resettlement is planned and intended. In the process of attracting and selecting migrants, the resettlement authorities were expected to make effective use of the media: (handouts (leaflet), posters, brochures, photovoltaics, etc.) newspapers, radio, movies, various publications. In the Uzbek SSR, the publication of material on resettlement in the official publications of the central, regional newspapers or district committees was very limited. But in other regions of the Soviet Union, the situation was different. In 1952, for example, an average of eight volunteer organizers worked in each of the Kirov Oblast's resettlement districts in the Russian Federation. There were also three and four radio sessions in each district. In the absence of a radio line, special telephones were connected to the broadcast, and at least 40-50 individuals organized advocacy activities at the meetings [11.P.131]. In the analysis of the reports of the General Directorate of Resettlement, it was noted that public awareness campaigns on relocated farms in Uzbekistan will be organized with the participation of a representative of the regional resettlement department and 15 (non-state) organizers [2.P.42]. But representatives of the Bukhara regional executive branch and the party body could not secure the participation of the representative of the directly responsible person (representative of the regional resettlement department) in the meetings, imposing public explanatory work on the kolkhozs farms. As a result, the selected households for relocation could not meet the requirements of the government. For example, the official letter sent by the chairman of the Gijduvan district party committee to Nabiev by the Kagan district executive committee is the basis for our opinion. In it: —Khalikov Shirin, a member of the Lenin kolkhoz in the Gijduvan district executive committee of your kolkhoz council, moved to a mobile farm on the Akhunboboev kolkhoz in the Uba desert village council of the Kagan district. Shirinova Orzi, the wife of Khalikov Shirin, and her daughters Shirinova Olima and Munavvara are still working on the Lenin collective farm in your village council. We ask you to instruct the chairman of the kolkhoz to transfer the comrades named in the farm of Khalilov Shirin to the kolkhoz named after Akhunboboev in the village council of Uba Choli, Kagan district [7.P.88] || - said in the archive materials. We can witness that many mistakes were made during the organizational selection process during the entire relocation period. We can witness that many mistakes were made during the organizational selection process during the entire relocation period. For example, in the 1970s, volunteers from Namangan region moved to the 29th state farm named after Murodov in the Bahoristan district of Kashkadarya region. For example, in the 1970s, volunteers from Namangan region moved to the 29th soviet farm named after Murodov in the Bahoristan district of Kashkadarya region. They were welcomed, provided with jobs, housing, and a decent salary. However, some of the migrants are dissatisfied with the work after working for several weeks and demand to be paid more than their labor, allocating a few hectares of land for the land. When they learned that the state farm did not have this

opportunity, they decided to go back. Apparently, in the Namagan region, the selection of volunteers was done irresponsibly, and those who were trying to earn a living did not notice in time [10.P.56-58], - said one of the sources. The issue of selection is an important component of resettlement policy, which determines the order of selection of migrants, depending on the type of farm established on the new land. Great attention is paid to the selection of exemplary and hard-working population with experience in cotton growing in agriculture. However, mistakes and shortcomings in the organization of advocacy events had a negative impact on the organizational selection process. A 1957 report by the —General Directorate of Resettlement focused on the issue of organizational selection, saying: —Of the 304 households selected by the Verkhne-Volinsky District Executive Committee for resettlement, 87 were former mobile households, locals, or other collective farms in the district. Those who were transferred to the kolkhozes-B.R) were composed of settlers [2.P.51].

As a result of monitoring the situation in the main resettlement centers, the Resettlement Department was able to identify a number of shortcomings. As a result of monitoring the situation in the main resettlement centers, —The Resettlement Department was able to identify a number of shortcomings. If the resettlement measures taken in the Republic were analyzed, it was natural that the scale of the problems would increase. Of the 233 households selected for relocation by the Bekabad District Executive Committee, 80 were from the Dzerzhinsky collective farm, specifically the former relocated ones. Similar cases were reported in the collective farms of Mirzachul, Syrdarya and KuyiChirchik districts [2.P.21]. Upon completion of registration and clearance for resettlement, the delivery of vehicles (trains, trucks, buses, etc.) directly to the designated address by the state would begin. The Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR entrusted the regional executive committee with the task of relocating the inter-district farms to a new location. Various organizations in the region have been involved [4,334] in order to transport migrants to their destination.

Various organizations in the region have been involved [4,334] in order to transport migrants to their destination. Various organizations in the region have been involved [4,334] (Regional Department of Agricultural Machinery, Department of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture, State Farms, various trusts) in order to transport migrants to their destination. But there were unexpected problems when the convoys mobilized for the evacuation arrived at the destination. Firstly, the number of migrants turned out to be lower than expected. Secondly, there was a problem with the fact that the property of the farms, whose relocation was envisaged, was not clearly allocated. Thirdly, instead of the households that applied for emigration, those who did not participate in the competition, those households that were not formalized, gathered in the Centers of relocation. Realizing that the brick had moved from the mold, the district executive committee and the supervisor of the regional relocation department decided to relocate any farm that had gathered by mutual agreement and expressed a desire to relocate. As a result, unexpected problems began to arise. In particular, on June 3, 1950, the chairman of the Executive Committee of Kagan district, Comrade Isabaev, was sent a message by the

chairman of the Executive Committee of Gijduvan district, Nabiev. In particular, —I would like to inform you that the Executive Committee of Gijduvan district has sent a letter to you that Turaev Egam, a member of the Lenin collective farm of Gavshun village council in our district, has moved to your district on a mobile farm. Among the things that took the above-mentioned comrade with him was the belongings of Karimov Tokhtani, a member of the same collective farm. That is why the district executive committee asks Karimov to bring Tukhta's belongings from Turayev Egam [8.56]. From this point of view, it will be possible to draw such a conclusion- that it was not possible to collect settlers in specially allocated areas, as a result of which the technicians went inside the addresses where they live and loaded with direct loads. Otherwise, there would be no cases of taking away something related to the neighbor. It was also questionable whether Uzbekistan adhered to the principle of voluntariness set out in the decision of the Council of Ministers [5.P.112].

The provincial administration has managed to relocate the households, albeit with great difficulty. The next problems are their placement, organization of economic life, allocation of benefits and housing, etc. Mistakes made during the selection and relocation of migrants also had a negative impact on placement. The success of the resettlement policy was assessed by the fact that the resettled population settled permanently in these areas. The resettlement of people living in the same area, ie relatives, neighbors and neighborhoods, is explained by the guarantee of their permanent residence in the new land. This practice has been tested in other regions of the country and has yielded positive results. During the construction of the South Surkhan Reservoir in the 1950s, 8 villages were relocated to the Oguz massif, while during the construction of the Tupolang Reservoir, 1 village was relocated en masse [12.P.107]. However, the provincial administration took a different approach, selecting 3 to 10 households from each collective farm to relocate. We can see an even more complicated situation when thinking about placement (Appendix 1).

Results The disparity of resettlement and placement plans is evident in the table. In 1950, 1,000 households in the province were relocated, but by June, 45 households had applied for relocation and were housed in the district archives. Apparently, it would not have been as if he had also volunteered work on formalization. In addition, the relocation of one, two or three households

From each village may have had a negative impact on the process of adaptation of settlers, and as soon as the relocation measures were taken, there were cases of returning of household. The procedure of registration of the resettled population was introduced in cooperation with the district executive committees and the resettlement department of the regional executive committee. However, a number of problems arise in this regard due to the fact that the normative and legal documents related to the registration do not reach the region in a timely manner, and the documents submitted to the executive committees are not fully understood by officials. The district executive committees are obliged to submit a written report to the region every 10 days on the progress of the resettlement activities and to submit their list the day after the resettlement [4.P.135]. The exact timing of the resettlement was set out in government decisions. However, shortcomings in the planning and selection process also had a negative impact on the

implementation of regulations. In particular, 24 hours for the resettlement of the displaced population, 3 days for the allocation of land to the farmland, 10 days for the issuance of loans to low-income Farms, 1 month period for the purchase of cattle, 6 months for the construction and repair of houses were determined. However, it was not possible to complete the census in the region within the specified timeframes. Reporting forms developed by the General Directorate of Resettlement for the registration of mobile farms (Form 636 registration of mobile households), placement (preparation of reports in Form 37) were not submitted to the regional resettlement department in a timely manner. As a result, the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR limited itself to reporting to the General Directorate of Resettlement on the activities of relocated farms by the district executive committees (Figure 4) [1.P.21]. New problems began to arise under the influence of mistakes made in the process of registration of migrants. These include timely provision of housing, credit allocation, use of benefits, tax exemptions, etc. For example, in one of the two letters sent by the Executive Committee of the Bukhara Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies to the Executive Committee of the Kagan District on April 22, 1952, to Comrade Isabaev: —The resettlement department of the Bukhara regional executive committee asks you to collect and prepare all the tickets for mobile households in the district executive committee for registration. Keep in mind that if the tickets of mobile households are not issued in time, they will definitely be subject to agricultural tax. When all the tickets have been collected, the district executive committee should inform the department [6.P.18].

Conclusion

Unfortunately, it was practically impossible to organize the work within the time frames specified in the regulations. As a result, the allocation of existing freedoms and privileges, which had been promised to resettled households and should be the basis for them to live in the new land, has been delayed. In the 1950s and 1960s, planned relocation measures at the regional level did not justify themselves.

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